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REVIEW ESSAY
Ken Burns, the Vietnam War, and the purpose of
history
The Vietnam War: A film by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick (2017)
America’s involvement in Vietnam began in secrecy. It ended 30 years later in
failure, witnessed by the entire world. It was begun in good faith by decent
people out of fateful misunderstandings, American over-confidence and Cold
War miscalculation. And it was prolonged because it seemed easier to muddle
through than to admit that it had been caused by tragic decisions made by
five American presidents belonging to both political parties.1
This restrained, even exculpatory, judgement comes shortly after the beginning
of Ken Burns and Lynn Novick’s new documentary, The VietnamWar. Clocking in
at eighteen hours of air time spread over ten episodes, the film has touched off
a national conversation in the USA about the Vietnam War and its legacies.
Central to this conversation are these evocative characterizations of American
action which writer Geoffrey C. Ward placed in the mouth of the narrator early in
the production: ‘good faith’, ‘decent people’, ‘fateful misunderstandings’, ‘tragic’.
Thesephrasespoint to apreoccupationnot justwithwhat America didduring the
war, but what America fundamentally is.2 On one side of this debate, the USA is
pictured as an isolationist and anti-imperialist nation which had been slow and
reluctant to rise to the responsibilities of world power in the 1940s and thereafter.
In the ColdWar and in Vietnam itself, its actions sprung from amarriage of power
and principle: using U.S.might to defend innocent, fledgling democracies against
Communist aggression. On the opposing side of the debate, the USA was some-
thingmuch darker: it was an imperialist and aggressive nation, or at the very least
a criminally irresponsible and misguided one. In this view, there was no other
explanation for why the USA was trying to thwart the legitimate nationalist
aspirations of the Vietnamese people and repeating the French experience in
Indochina. In the words of Guenter Grass, the USA ‘lost in Vietnam its right to
appeal to morals’.3
Burns and Novick have stepped right into the centre of this debate.
Burns’ films (on which he has frequently collaborated with Novick) have
1‘Déjà Vu’, The Vietnam War, PBS, 24 September 2017, television.
2Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988), 445.
3John Vincour, ‘Anti-Americanism in West Germany Appears in Many Guises’, The New York Times,
5 July 1981, E3.
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often served as a touchstone for debate on topics as wide as Baseball (1994),
Jazz (2001), World War II (The War, 2007) and The Civil War (1990). Those of
us who teach about the Vietnam War for a living know that the preconcep-
tions of our students frequently have their origins in a viewing of The Deer
Hunter or Apocalypse Now, and Burns and Novick’s contribution to the visual
history of the Vietnam War is likely to be a similarly formative moment in
public memory. Both before and after the series started airing in
September 2017, Burns spoke of his hope that it could even act as
a starting point for national reconciliation over the war and its legacies.
The Vietnam War, he said, was a ‘virus’ that had infected Americans with
maladies such as disunion, mistrust of government, and lack of civil dis-
course. His film aimed to be ‘some sort of vaccination, a little bit more of the
disease to get you immune’.4 On another occasion Burns said that he hoped
the documentary might go ‘some distance towards ending the kind of
divisions that Vietnam sponsored . . . [to] get to a place where our country
can feel like it’s back to shared stories, and not “us against them”’.5
This has not been the result. Although The Vietnam War received extre-
mely high praise from television critics in general, many historians, public
figures and veterans with a particular interest in the conflict have been less
forgiving. This essay analyzes The Vietnam War and the debate it has
engendered, placing it in the context of recent revisionist scholarship.
Ultimately it argues that Burns and Novick’s superficial telling of the history
of the war fails to get to grips with the deeper ideas and structures of belief
that led the USA into the Vietnam debacle in the first place – and which, if
not tackled, threaten to lead it down similarly unwise paths in the future.
Ken Burns and the purpose of history
Burns is probably the most influential historian in the USA, so his approach
to his craft matters. Burns’ primary interest is in American history, and
particularly the lived experience of American history for the individuals
who were there. This leads him to adopt a bottom-up methodology which
privileges ‘stories, anecdotes . . . people, [and] biography’.6 This approach
was particularly notable in The Vietnam War, which focused on interviews
with soldiers, anti-war activists and others who experienced the war and its
consequences at the grassroots rather than on high-level policymakers and
4Holly Ramer, ‘Burns Sees Vietnam War as a Virus, Documentary as Vaccination’, Stars and Stripes,
16 July 2017, https://www.stripes.com/news/veterans/burns-sees-vietnam-war-as-virus-documentary-
as-vaccination-1.478322.
5Quoted in Kristi Turnquist, ‘“The Vietnam War”: Ken Burns and Lynn Novick’s Powerful Film is
Engrossing, and Appalling’, The Oregonian, 14 September 2017, http://www.oregonlive.com/tv/
2017/09/the_vietnam_war_ken_burns_and.html.
6David Thelan, ‘The Movie Maker as Historian: Conversations with Ken Burns’, The Journal of American
History 81/3 (1994), 1035.
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politicians. The directors also took the decision not to feature interviews
with historians or other academics in the documentary. Burns has been
heavily critical of academic historians for ‘murdering our [American] history’
and killing the public appetite for consuming works of history. In his view,
the murder weapon has been the professionalization of the academy: the
tendency of historians to produce ‘maddeningly abstruse and stultifyingly
specific’ work only intended to be read by other specialist historians.7 He has
also accused academic historians of being obsessed with advancing parti-
cular interpretations rather than simply opening their ears and listening to
the broader chorus of voices in American history, with their diverse and
contradictory perspectives. In Burns’ conception, the goal of history is to
stitch together the many different truths experienced by those affected by
an event rather than privileging one particular viewpoint. Reflecting this, the
promotional material for The Vietnam War stressed the point that ‘[t]here is
no single truth in war’. This recognition that truth is multiple should result in
a shared story which tolerates different points of view and serves the
primary function of helping the American people come to terms with an
event in their history, hence anchoring them securely for the future. ‘People
without a past are not a people,’ Burns has said, adding that ‘without that
awareness [of history] we have no sense of where we’ve been in order to
know where we’re going’.8
As seen in The Vietnam War, this approach yields mixed results. Burns’
desire to tell a shared story so that the American nation can know where it
came from and where it is going reflects the old ‘consensus tradition’ of
American historiography. This tradition acknowledged the diverse racial,
social and sectional voices in American history, but stressed above all else
that a shared liberal ideology of American-ness united these different
groups. The consensus tradition tended to focus on cooperation and down-
played the existence of fundamental conflicts between different groups in
American society. The American story was, in this telling, one for which the
motto could indeed be e pluribus unum – out of the many, one.9 The
problem with this approach was that, as Burns has admitted of his own
work, it focused much more on the unum than the pluribus – much more on
what united rather than what divided. The result was an exaggerated stress
on the shared story of American-ness which downplayed the conflicts over
ideology and morality which had in fact animated American history.10 The
Vietnam War takes a very similar approach, with the same problem resulting.
7Ibid., 1032.
8Ibid.
9John Higham, ‘Beyond Consensus: The Historian as Moral Critic’, The American Historical Review 67/3
(1962), 615.
10Thomas Cripps, ‘Historical Truth: An Interview with Ken Burns’, The American History Review 100/3
(1995), 747. See also Thelan, ‘The Movie Maker as Historian’, 1047.
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The quest for a ‘shared story’ which can prove instructive for the nation – to
‘include the diverse tributaries of our experience into something that might
nourish the whole’, as Burns has put it – can only be achieved at the cost of
leaving unexamined strategic, moral and ideological questions which in fact
sharply divided Americans during the war, and continue to divide historians
today.11 The failure of the documentary to address these questions is
a severe limitation, not only because the particular answers that policy-
makers provided during the Vietnam War led to the deaths of millions,
but also because we have a stake in the answers that will be given in the
future.
Why was the USA in Vietnam?
Given that the Vietnam War led to immense suffering and ended in
American defeat, the question of why the USA became involved in the
first place is an important one. As we have seen, Burns and Novick begin
their documentary by framing this issue in a way that minimizes blame for
the ‘tragic’ consequences of the ‘fateful misunderstandings’ by ‘decent
people’ which led the U.S. into the war. Their focus on the suffering of
those experiencing the war and its consequences at the grassroots can
sometimes make the conflict seem like an act of God rather than an event
brought about by politicians and policymakers, whose actions receive much
less attention in the film. Instead, the story of the war is framed as one of
shared suffering. To their credit, Burns and Novick also included the voices
of Vietnamese veterans, so the story is not told – as it so often has been in
the past – as primarily one of American suffering. Burns and Novick’s ‘shared
story’ of suffering could even plausibly become a basis for reconciliation as
participants on both sides realize they were part of the same ‘republic of
suffering’, as one historian has put it when describing a different war.12 But
such a reconciliation could only be superficial because it ignores the ques-
tion which hovers just above the frame, always out of sight: why did this
suffering have to be endured? It is a weakness of Burns and Novick’s
experiential, bottom-up approach that it is unable to grapple with this
question.
Scholars have not been so bashful, including in response to Burns and
Novick’s film. The ‘tragedy’ interpretation of the origins of the Vietnam War
has two main rivals. The first is the ‘Noble Cause’ school of revisionism,
named for a phrase used by then-candidate for president Ronald Reagan to
describe the Vietnam War in 1980.13 Far from seeing the war as a misguided
11Cripps, ‘Historical Truth’, 9.
12Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Vintage
2009).
13Gary R. Hess, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Oxford: Blackwell 2009), 14.
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‘tragedy’, this interpretation stresses the moral responsibility of the USA to
stop the spread of Communism, a totalitarian form of government which
the school contends brings misery to anyone ruled by it. As Norman
Podhoretz once framed it, the central point of the ‘Noble Cause’ school is
that the expansion of Communist rule to South Vietnam would have been
a greater evil, both morally and strategically, than the war which attempted
to stop it.14 If there is a tragedy according to ‘Noble Cause’ writers, it is only
that the USA failed. The second critique has come from scholars and
commentators on the left who feel that the interpretation of the war as
a ‘tragedy’ allows U.S. policymakers to escape blame for decisions they took
which led to a war costing millions of lives. At the heart of this debate is the
assignation of blame. The ‘Noble Cause’ school wants blame for the suffer-
ing caused by the war to be placed firmly at the feet of the Vietnamese
Communist movement. Critics on the left assign blame to the aggressive
and imperialistic policies of the USA itself, which had no business attempt-
ing to quash the legitimate nationalist demands of the Vietnamese.
Responding to the documentary on behalf of the ‘Lost Cause’ school,
leading revisionist Lewis Sorley blasted it for failing to stress that it was
‘aggression by the North Vietnamese Communists’ that led to the
‘bloodshed and agony’ of the war.15 Phillip Jennings, author of The
Politically Incorrect Guide to the Vietnam War, accused Burns (he doesn’t
mention Novick) of positing ‘moral equivalency’ between the U.S. and the
Vietnamese Communist movement. ‘Communist North Vietnam invaded
a South Vietnam striving for democracy’, Jennings writes, and Burns
attempts to ‘justify the cowardly and morally bankrupt left that supported
the communist invasion of South Vietnam and turned its back on the
murder, imprisonment, and misery of our former allies’.16 Illustrating the
extent to which the debate over moral responsibility for the war is tied to
the question of American identity and patriotism, both Sorley and Jennings
go on to accuse their opponents of being anti-American. Sorley claims that
‘Burns does not much like America, an outlook which permeates his work’,
while Jennings alleges that ‘the left cannot accept’ that ‘Americans are
better than communists’.17 These revisionist authors also strongly reject
Burns and Novick’s hope that their documentary might sooth over disagree-
ment and pave the way to a ‘shared story’ of the war. Sorley described the
idea that the documentary might lead to reconciliation as ‘fatuous’, adding:
‘There is no middle ground, and the Burns film demonstrates . . . how deep
14Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster 1982), 195.
15Lewis Sorley comments during a panel at the Center for Strategic & International Studies,
29 September 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HfLCMEkrz8.
16Phillip Jennings, ‘Justifying the Betrayal of Vietnam Emerges as the Raison d’être of Ken Burns’ Film
on War’, The New York Sun, 11 October 2017. See also Phillip Jennings, The Politically Incorrect Guide
to the Vietnam War (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing 2010).
17Lewis Sorley comments, 29 September 2017; Jennings, ‘Justifying the Betrayal’.
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and unbridgeable the divide remains’.18 Another leading revisionist, Mark
Moyar, alleges that the documentary amounts to a ‘partisan harangue that is
certain to keep Americans divided’.19
Response from the other side of the debate has also been critical. Military
historian Andrew Bacevich argues that while it is a truism that war is
a ‘tragedy’, this observation does not get us very far. It can even deflect
and excuse. In contrast to the ‘Lost Cause’ narrative of a noble America
riding to the rescue of those threatened by Communism, Bacevich argues
that the USA was wrong to involve itself in what was essentially
a Vietnamese conflict. Had America instead ‘allowed the Vietnamese to
settle their own differences . . . far, far fewer people would have died’.
Ultimately, Bacevich argues, ‘the war was begun – and prolonged past all
reason – by people who lacked wisdom and, when it was most needed,
courage’. Far from being passive actors in a tragedy, American leaders
lacked virtue, and they ‘screwed up’.20 Historian Robert Buzzanco goes
further, writing that ‘Vietnam, to many of us, was a war crime, a ghastly
waste of millions of lives brought on not by decent men, but by men of
power and wealth who had little interest in democracy or freedom, at home
or in Indochina’.21 By focusing exclusively on the lived experiences of people
caught up in the war’s consequences, Burns and Novick risk ‘naturalizing’
the war as something which just happened, almost by chance, rather than
being the result of a conscious and questionable set of decisions.
A thorough investigation of these decisions might have led to a deeper
consideration of the mistaken geopolitical calculations and misplaced belief
in the efficacy of hard power that has caused the USA grief in many wars,
including Vietnam. As Bacevich argues, the continuing U.S. mission in
Afghanistan – now longer than that in Vietnam – makes larger questions
such as these ‘all the more salient’.22 Conversely, refusing to investigate
these questions limits the documentary’s potential as a learning tool for
American society. By leaving fundamental myths about the USA and the war
untouched, it even risks reinforcing them – with the result being ‘little more
than a high production value version of Ronald Reagan’s noble cause’.23
Frances FitzGerald has also lamented the documentary’s limitations as
a learning tool. While she admits that some meaning can be found in the
tragic individual stories told in the documentary, she adds that ‘one would
18Lewis Sorley comments, 29 September 2017.
19Mark Moyar, ‘Ken Burn’s “Vietnam” is Fair to the Troops, but Not the Cause’, The Wall Street Journal,
6 October 2017.
20Andrew J. Bacevich, ‘Past All Reason’, The Nation, 19 September 2017, accessed 10 February 2018,
https://academic.oup.com/dh/article/42/3/380/4953032.
21Robert Buzzanco, ‘Don Draper Does Vietnam (a.k.a., Ken Burns Teaches the War in 10 Easy Lessons)’,
Diplomatic History 42/3 (2018), 384.
22Bacevich, ‘Past All Reason’.
23Edward A. Martini, ‘The Placebo Effect: Reflection on Ken Burns’s and Lynn Novick’s The Vietnam War’,
Diplomatic History 42/3 (2018), 401.
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hope that they are not the only meaning to be drawn from the Vietnam
War.’24
Recent scholarship on the war shows that the debate is far from over in
scholarly circles. Over the last 20 years or so, mainstream historical scholar-
ship on the war has become ever more sophisticated, especially through its
engagement with Vietnamese language sources. Over the same time period
revisionists have become more scholarly in their approach, producing dee-
ply-researched works such as Moyar’s Triumph Forsaken and Sorley’s A Better
War.25 In 2017, the revisionist school achieved something of a maturation
with the publication of the first general synthesis of revisionist scholarship,
The Vietnam War Reexamined by Michael J. Kort.26
Kort’s book is the most forceful statement of the ‘Noble Cause’ school
since Podhoretz’s Why We Were in Vietnam and Michael Lind’s Vietnam: The
Necessary War.27 Publishing in 1982, Podhoretz charged that even the
original architects of the Vietnam War had ‘concede[d] the moral and
political arguments to the antiwar forces’ and cast himself as a lone voice
willing to stand up for the morality of America’s attempt to defend South
Vietnam against totalitarian Communism. In particular, Podhoretz argued
that the conduct of Communists in Indochina since the war ended –
a record which included re-education camps, genocide by the Khmer
Rouge, and boat people fleeing Vietnam – showed America’s conduct in
the war to have been ‘an act of imprudent idealism whose moral soundness
has been overwhelmingly vindicated by the hideous consequences of our
defeat’.28
Kort’s book follows in this tradition. Whereas mainstream scholars
stress that the Vietnamese Communists succeeded in positioning them-
selves as the most legitimate embodiment of Vietnamese nationalism,
Kort rejects this. He argues throughout that the ‘totalitarian Stalinist’
North Vietnamese Communists did not represent ‘the only legitimate or
viable form of Vietnamese nationalism from the mid-1940s through the
mid-1970s’. Kort argues that it was ‘organization, propaganda skills, and
military prowess’ that allowed the Communists to triumph rather than
the rightness of their cause, and adds that ‘these qualities are hardly
a reasonable basis on which to crown one political movement with
legitimacy at the expense of rival movements whose agendas may have
more closely corresponded to the overall interests and desires of the
24Frances FitzGerald, ‘The Pity of it All’, The New York Review of Books, 23 November 2017.
25Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2006); Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years
in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt 1999).
26Michael G. Kort, The Vietnam War Reexamined (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017).
27Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster 1982); Michael Lind,
Vietnam: The Necessary War (New York: Free Press 1999).
28Podhoretz, Why We Were in Vietnam, 13, 210.
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people of Vietnam’.29 The Communists ‘had no use for democracy in any
form’ and their August Revolution was a ‘coup’. The Viet Minh’s goal in
the latter was ‘not independence’, as evidenced by the fact they perse-
cuted non-Communist nationalists (although Kort later allows, contradic-
torily, that their goal was in fact to ensure that ‘independence would
result in a Vietminh dictatorship’).30 Faced with such a pernicious adver-
sary, it was legitimate and morally sound for the USA to intervene to
protect non-Communist Vietnamese against predation by their Marxist
countrymen.
Kort’s arguments have severe limitations. The first way is through an
unhelpfully simplified and polarized view of the ideology and actions of
the Vietnamese Communist movement. Kort stresses that the Vietnamese
Communists owed ‘their primary loyalty . . . to international Marxism-
Leninism, an ideology that viewed the nationalism in colonial regions as
a means to be used to promote world revolution rather than an end in
itself’. Vietnamese Communists were hence not ‘authentic nationalists’.31
Moyar likewise argues that Ho Chi Minh ‘firmly adhered to the Leninist
principle that Communist nations should subordinate their interests to
those of the international Communist movement’.32 Making the binary
even more stark, Kort argues that Vietnamese Communist domestic policy
flatly contradicted what he calls ‘traditional nationalism’. He cites actions
such as land collectivization, the nationalization of the economy, and ‘the
establishment of a massive secret police apparatus’, which he says ‘have
absolutely nothing to do with traditional nationalism’.33
This attempt to establish a binary opposition between nationalists and
Communists is unhelpful, as other recent studies have shown. It ignores the
fact that political identities can be complex and multiple. A landmark recent
work by Tuong Vu demonstrates that far from sacrificing their national interests
for the sake of international Communism as their opponents alleged, Vietnamese
Communists saw an essential synergy between the two. ‘To them,’ Vu writes,
‘national liberation was important but would mean little if class oppression and
exploitation continued’. Independence could only bemeaningful if it was accom-
panied by building socialism at home and developing productive alliances with
the Communist world abroad. There did not have to be a contradiction between
nationalism and these goals. As Politburomember Pham vanDong put it in 1958,
‘to be patriotic is to develop socialism; to develop socialism is to be patriotic’.34
While their Communism gave them a particular domestic program at home and
29Kort, Vietnam War Reexamined, 217, 39.
30Ibid., 59, 61.
31Kort, Vietnam War Reexamined, 56, 64.
32Moyar, Triumph Forsaken, 9.
33Kort, Vietnam War Reexamined, 68.
34Tuong Vu, Vietnam’s Communist Revolution: The Power and Limits of Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 2017), 17, 141.
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ideological alignment abroad, this scarcely made them any different to – or less
nationalist than – America’s anti-Communist Cold War allies. Such regimes fre-
quently pursued high modernist development and economic redistribution
programs and established police states which targeted those with alternative
nationalist visions. One can be starkly critical of Hanoi’s ideology and domestic
policy, topics whichwe are learningmuchmore about thanks towork by scholars
such as Vu. But to downplay their nationalism to the extent that revisionist
scholars do is to do violence to the historical record. In another landmark recent
work, Pierre Asselin labels Hanoi’s quest to advance international revolution
through the means of the national struggle ‘patriotic internationalism’, and
both elements of this formulation are important. The leadership in Hanoi were
‘not communists in the classical sense; nor were theymere nationalists, as is often
assumed by American historians of the VietnamWar – they were an amalgam of
elements’.35
A strict Communist/nationalist binary also ignores the personnel changes,
tactical moves, and shifting international diplomacy of Hanoi’s leadership. As
Vu demonstrates, Vietnamese Communists were ideologically committed to
the socialist camp and trusted socialist countries over capitalist ones, much
as the UK or France was more likely to trust the USA during the Cold War
than they were Cuba or the Soviet Union. Yet this no more made Hanoi
slavish servants of Moscow and Beijing than London and Paris were of
Washington. In fact, the North Vietnamese leadership sought national reuni-
fication much more aggressively than the Soviet Union or China wanted,
and often in a manner which the two Communist superpowers worried
might lead to a wider war which could devastate international
Communism. Kort himself notes that at the time of the 1954 Geneva
Conference, the Soviet Union and China were in favour of the permanent
partition of Vietnam ‘to prevent Vietnam from causing another Cold War
crisis that these powers did not want’.36 Diplomacy between these three
countries ebbed and flowed for the following two decades. Thanks to
pathbreaking work by Vu, Lien-Hang Nguyen and Asselin, we know that
the North Vietnamese leadership was frequently bitterly divided on how to
balance the quest for reunification with both the socialist development of
North Vietnam and relations with their socialist patrons.37 In 1964, Le Duan
consolidated power in Hanoi, displacing Ho, who was viewed as an irre-
deemable moderate on the question of reunification and too sympathetic to
Nikita Khrushchev’s views on the need for ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the
35Pierre Asselin, Vietnam’s American War: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2018), 111.
36Kort, Vietnam War Reexamined, 97.
37Lian-Hang Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill
NC: University of North Carolina Press 2012); Pierre Asselin, Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War,
1954–1965 (Berkeley CA: University of California Press 2013); Asselin, Vietnam’s American War; Vu,
Vietnam’s Communist Revolution.
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West. Against the wishes of the Soviets, Le Duan won the blessing of the
Politburo in Hanoi for ‘mass combat operations’ against South Vietnam and
continued to pursue them even as China also turned towards the West and
began discouraging him later in the decade.38 This was not the behaviour of
a regime slavishly following the dictates of an international Communist
conspiracy, or one subordinating its nationalist goals – of which the fore-
most was reunification – to anything else.
The relationship that Kort posits between ideology and technique is also
problematic. Attempting to delegitimize the Communist movement by
claiming it owed its success to technical prowess rather than popular sup-
port ignores the link between the two. It was precisely because the
Communist movement was viewed as legitimate that it managed to build
and sustain its formidable organizational, military and propaganda appara-
tus in the face of stupendous violence. As we learn more about the home
front in North Vietnam, we are reminded that tight social control, lack of
political freedoms, and a coercive police state played a role as well.39
Likewise, aid from China and the Soviet Union was also instrumental to
North Vietnamese victory in the war, just as an ‘American power source’ had
been keeping South Vietnam running since the 1950s.40 But most funda-
mental of all to the Communist movement’s success was its ability to
motivate millions to struggle, suffer, and die under its aegis. Historians are
more and more aware of the need to also take alternative, non-Communist
forms of Vietnamese nationalism seriously – as Christopher Goscha’s new
history of modern Vietnam does convincingly.41 There were indeed compet-
ing nationalisms in twentieth century Vietnam – one form was just stronger
than the rest, a situation for which non-Communist nationalists often had
themselves to blame. In South Vietnam, the Communist movement mana-
ged to position itself as the protector of the ‘interests and desires of the
people of Vietnam’ (to use Kort’s phrase) in large part by protecting them
from the predatory regime in Saigon, a dynamic that thoughtful observers
have understood since the 1950s. As for the role of fraternal Communist aid,
one only has to imagine how useful this aid would have been sat rusting in
warehouses or abandoned on the battlefield because the Vietnamese
Communists lacked the motivated soldiers and cadres to deploy it in battle.
Even though Burns and Novick’s narrative approach is not framed in
terms of these debates, it does serve to complicate simplistic revisionist
tropes. They make clear that Ho Chi Minh was both a nationalist and
a Communist, and that the Communists enjoyed widespread popular
38Asselin, Vietnam’s American War, 108, 189–90.
39Asselin, Vietnam’s American War; Nguyen, Hanoi’s War.
40Jeffrey T. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965–1973 (Washington DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office 1998), 497.
41Christopher Goscha, Vietnam: A New History (New York: Basic 2016).
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support. Yet by refusing to tackle these issues head-on, the documentary
misses an opportunity to dispel fallacious arguments which were both
instrumental to the USA getting into the war and are – as Kort’s book
shows – still widespread.
Was the war winnable?
Aside from the righteousness of American involvement in the Vietnam War,
the other major concern of revisionist work is the question of whether the
war was winnable. Counterfactual revisionists have long argued that the
U.S. could have achieved victory if only it had followed a more effective
military strategy or made different choices at key junctures, such as in the
run-up of the 1963 overthrow of President Diem. Authors writing in this vein
tend to argue either that the U.S. should have deployed greater coercion
against North Vietnam itself, or that it should have adopted a more sophis-
ticated counterinsurgency strategy in the South.42 Some writers have even
argued that ‘there were numerous roads to victory, but . . . Washington chose
none of them’.43
Burns and Novick’s documentary mostly avoids engaging with this con-
troversy. By focusing on the lived experience of participants in the war, they
leave little room for dwelling on counterfactual scenarios. This has led the
documentary to be criticized by revisionists whose entire narrative of the
war is inseparable from such theories. In Moyar’s case, this viewpoint has
been intertwined with a criticism of how the documentary portrays
American troops. He complains that the veterans’ voices we hear in The
Vietnam War are ‘somber’, ‘disenchanted’ and haunted by the ‘trauma and
futility of battle’, despite the fact that a 1980 Veterans Administration survey
showed that 90% of Vietnam combat veterans were glad to have served,
and that 69% enjoyed their time there. More importantly, the same survey
showed that 92% of veterans agreed with the statement that ‘the trouble in
Vietnam was that our troops were asked to fight in a war which our political
leaders in Washington would not let them win’.44 In this narrative, the
‘tragedy’ is not the war itself but that civilian policymakers tied the feet of
the military, not letting them travel down one of the available roads to
victory. Moyar complains that Burns and Novick do not discuss ‘the bitter
disputes in Washington over the use of U.S. ground forces in Laos or North
42Classic works from these perspectives are, respectively, Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical
Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Presidio 1995); Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam
(Baltimore MD: John Hopkins University Press 1998).
43C. Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam (London: Frank Cass 2002), 2. See also
Michael G. Kort, The Vietnam War Reexamined (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017), 27.
44Mark Moyar, ‘Ken Burn’s “Vietnam” is Fair to the Troops, but Not the Cause’, The Wall Street Journal,
6 October 2017.
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Vietnam’, or ‘revelations from North Vietnamese officials acknowledging that
such measures would have thwarted Hanoi’s strategy’.45
Moyar’s critique shows that a line of argument that Jeffrey Kimball long
ago called the ‘stab-in-the-back legend’ remains alive and well.46 The stab-in
-the-back legend displays classic characteristics of what psychologists call in-
group/out-group bias, in which every action by an in-group is rationalized
and justified whereas every action by an out-group is criticized and seen as
inspired by perverse motives. Through this pattern of thought, the ‘stab-in-
the-back’ interpretation externalizes blame for U.S. defeat entirely to civilian
policymakers. A virtuous and effective military had its hands tied by villai-
nous civilians who, pandering to base political instincts, betrayed the sol-
diers (and eventually South Vietnam) by failing to allow them to do what
was needed to win.
The problem here is not so much the criticism of civilian strategists –
there is plenty of blame to go around for the Vietnam debacle – but the fact
that this black and white pattern of thinking precludes any attempt to place
their actions in a meaningful historic context. In turn, this prevents any
serious consideration of the problems which inevitably arise when demo-
cratic governments fight wars of choice. For instance, it is entirely predict-
able that the political will to pursue such a conflict will atrophy over time as
casualties, costs and psychic blows like the Tet Offensive of 1968 mount. It is
equally predictable that an illegitimate and unpopular government will not
be able to bomb and shoot its way to legitimacy, especially not on the
timeline required by that government’s democratic ally, which has to always
be worrying about the next election.47 These are not external factors which
can be blamed for ruining an otherwise sound strategy, but rather factors
that needed to be considered in devising a sound strategy in the first place.
It is important to realize this because of the tendency to draw lessons from
past conflicts. The black and white thinking of the ‘stab-in-the-back’ school
points to the ‘lesson’ that civilians ought not place restrictions on the
military once the war began. A wider perspective would question whether
the war should have been started in the first place.
Burns and Novick’s narrative approach prevents them from discussing
these wider issues about strategy formation in a democracy, which is
a missed opportunity given the continued influence of the stab-in-the-
back legend. But it does allow them to do a convincing job of demonstrat-
ing the domestic pressures faced by successive presidents, particularly
Johnson and Nixon, and the ways in which their domestic governing styles
and policy in the war were intertwined. While the stab-in-the-back
45Ibid.
46Jeffrey P. Kimball, ‘The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War’, Armed Forces & Society 14/3
(1988), 433–58.
47M. Chris Mason, ‘Nation-Building is an Oxymoron’, Parameters 46/1 (2016), 67–79.
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interpretation avoids any serious discussion of the workings of domestic
politics, Burns and Novick’s focus – especially their ample coverage of the
anti-war movement – serves as an implicit dismissal of this simplified
narrative. For instance, viewers can easily see how Nixon’s secretive and
authoritarian governing style enabled him to take escalatory steps in the
war. They can also see how the same style led him to Watergate, which in
turn poisoned executive/legislative relations and led to Congress banning
the re-introduction of U.S. forces into Indochina after 1973. Stab-in-the-back
adherents like one of these things – Nixon’s authoritarian governing style
and the escalation it enabled – while tending to view Watergate as if it were
‘disembodied’ and somehow unrelated to the first.48 In reality, the sort of
chicanery which became necessary to continue the war in the face of public
opposition only heightened that opposition – another predictable develop-
ment. More useful on this matter are recent works by Daddis and Kadura
which have subtly explored the relationship between domestic politics,
developments on the ground in Vietnam, and the options available to
both local actors such as Westmoreland and Abrams and to policymakers
in Washington.49
Burns and Novick’s documentary does less to dispel the alternative
counterfactual argument, which states that the U.S. could have won if it
had adopted a more sophisticated counterinsurgency strategy in the
South. This thesis has recently been advanced anew by Max Boot in
a biography of Edward Lansdale.50 Lansdale was an Air Force officer
and CIA operative who specialized in covert action in support of allied
governments. He is most famous for his involvement in the defeat of the
Hukbalahap insurgency and political rise of President Ramon Magsaysay
in the Philippines. From there, Lansdale went on to South Vietnam, where
he was a confidante of Diem in the mid-1950s. After a stint back state-
side, he returned to South Vietnam in 1965, but failed to re-establish his
influence and became a marginal figure. Boot argues that we ought to
view Lansdale as a unique individual whose strategic insight and talents
were tragically ignored when they might have saved the USA from
a painful quagmire, and even delivered victory. While acknowledging
that the latter may have been impossible, Boot hedges by adding that
it is ‘no exaggeration to suggest that the whole conflict, the worst
military defeat in American history, might have taken a very different
48Kimball, ‘Stab-in-the-Back Legend’, 442.
49Johannes Kadura, The War after the War: The Struggle for Credibility During America’s Exit from Vietnam
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 2016); Gregory A. Daddis, Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing
American Strategy in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014); Gregory A. Daddis,
Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017).
50Max Boot, The Road not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York:
Liveright 2018).
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course – one that was less costly and potentially more successful’ if the
counsel of Lansdale, a ‘singular visionary’, had been followed.51
Boot claims in his introduction that his book is not intended as ‘a brief
for . . . Lansdale, nor for . . . counterinsurgency and nation building’.52 If so, it
is unfortunate that it serves to reproduce and reinforce many of the myths
that have led the USA into failed counterinsurgency and nation-building
ventures in the past and may do so again in the future.
The first of these is a misplaced faith in what American ‘can-do-ism’ can
accomplish. Lansdale, who never learned to speak any foreign language, had
an enthusiastic amateur anthropologist’s love of trivia and ephemera – for
instance, he loved to collect folk songs and regale Filipino and Vietnamese
peasants with his harmonica. This might have allowed him to ‘break down
barriers with sceptical Asians’ (although, tellingly, we almost always only have
Lansdale or some other American’s word for it), but it hardly constituted a deep
insight into the societies or cultures hewasworking to change. ‘Lansdalism’, Boot
tells us, was based on American principles inscribed in ‘the bedrock of the
Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights’ and the mantra ‘[o]vercome
goodwith evil’. Suchplatitudes apparently carried theweight of immensewisdom
in somewhere like Vietnam, where ‘freedom was an entirely new concept’.53
Boot’s reproduction of this essentially colonial logic – that the benighted natives
can be saved by a white man armed only with pluck, an anthropologist’s note-
book, and the ideals of his homeland – reinforces a dangerous belief which has
led the USA into one too many foreign misadventures.
To see this, we only need to transpose the characters in Boot’s tale. Imaginewe
were told that a plucky Vietnamese spy, speaking no English, could land in the
USA and bring about a revolution in governance through his innate wisdom and
ancestral values (Confucianism, after all, is an entirely new concept in the West).
We would consider such a story absurd. That we are asked to accept it when told
the otherway around, with theAmerican in the role of saviour, can only be due to
a radical denying of Vietnamese agency, tradition and history – rendering them
a tabula rasa upon which America can work its magic.
This leads us to the second myth, one which exaggerates the ability of heroic
Lawrence of Arabia type figures to alter the fate of nations. Reproducing an error
which has bedevilled many nation-building efforts, Boot consistently fails to give
dueweight to the agency of the Vietnamese figureswithwhomLansdale dealt or
the structural factors which shaped their behaviour.54 Diem’s failure to follow
Lansdale’s advice becomes evidence of the former’s obtuseness, rather than
51Ibid., xxxix.
52Ibid., l.
53Ibid., 12, 11, 13, 200.
54An error that the most recent literature on Diem avoids. For instance, see Edward Miller, Misalliance:
Ngo Dinh Diem, the USA, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
2013); Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the USA, and 1950s Southern Vietnam
(Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press 2013).
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evidence that the latter may not have known what he was talking about. Upon
meeting Diem for the first time, Lansdale handed him ‘a memorandum offering
the new prime minister suggestions on how to govern’. Diem was a fierce
nationalist with his own very definite ideas about how to govern, and what he
thought about being handed such a missive by someone who had been in the
country of his birth for less than a month is left to the reader’s imagination.
Lansdale quickly fell out of favourwithDiemafter trying topersuadehim to adopt
democratic reforms. ‘How different history might have been,’ laments Boot, ‘if
Lansdale or a Lansdale-like figure remained close enough to Diem to exercise
a benign influence’.55 But this ignores Diem’s own agency, and the fact he acted
as he did due to multiple structural pressures: his own personal history with the
Communist movement, his need to maintain the support of the landholding
class, and his weak state apparatus.
An exploration of these myths is important not just for a deeper under-
standing of the Vietnam War – for instance, in exploring how implicitly-held
cultural and racial hierarchies worked to deny agency to the Vietnamese and
exaggerate the ability of Americans to shape their destiny. These myths are
also important because, as Boot’s work shows, they remain with us today –
and could, if not tackled, be an ingredient in another American foreign
policy disaster in the future.
Conclusion
This essay has outlined two fundamental debates – one moral, one strategic –
about America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Both debates are associated
with particular (mis)representations of historical facts about the war, be they the
relationship between Vietnamese Communism and nationalism or the ability of
American advisors to transform local partners. In both cases, Burns and Novick’s
documentary provides a narrative that complicates revisionist claims. But due to
its focus on consensus and experiential exposition, it does not take the opportu-
nity to tackle and destroy the myths and misconceptions about American power
and Vietnamese politics which led the USA into the war in the first place. This
matters because thesemyths andmisconceptions remain alive andwell, not least
in revisionist scholarship on the VietnamWar. Given their potential to again lead
the USA downmorally and strategically questionable paths, they deserve a more
thorough critique.
What ultimately can we conclude about Burns and Novick’s practice of
history? Burns and Novick’s narrative method and its focus on a shared story
of ‘American-ness’ can only get us so far in appreciating the meaning and
significance of a historical event such as the Vietnam War, one which is so
close to us that we still live, breathe and act out its controversies and errors.
55Boot, Road not Taken, 209, 287, 297.
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The ‘national healing’ Burns wished for implies not a useful confrontation
and interrogation of these controversies and errors, but rather a soothing
return to the status quo. This status quo has led the USA to recently repeat
in Iraq and Afghanistan many of the same mistakes made in Vietnam and
gives us no reason to suspect it will not do so again in the future.
A documentary history of the Vietnam War which truly gets to grips with
what went wrong in Southeast Asia, including the deeper structures and
patterns of thought that made the war possible, will have to await film-
makers with a more critical eye. Such filmmakers would understand that
what is past is present, and what happened in Vietnam cannot be usefully
separated from the myths and stories we have told about it since. They
would focus on pluribus as much as unum. And they would understand that
while it may be true that we need history to tell us who we are and where
we are going, a superficial rendition of it presents us with the risk that we
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